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The relationship between price uncertainty and specific investment is examined in a 
dynamic model that integrates the theories of real options and investment holdup.  
Because of weak contract enforcement, bilateral firms cannot use a contract to govern 
their bilateral investment and exchange relationship. These firms instead rely on an 
implicit self-enforcing agreement, and they reduce the investment distortion by 
negotiating an ex ante transfer (i.e., the investment expense of one firm is partially 
paid for by the other firm).  In the absence of uncertainty, the ex ante transfer ensures 
that investment hold-up is fully eliminated.  Our main result is that uncertainty 
introduces an inefficiency into the ex ante transfer bargaining game, which in turn 
causes an inefficiently long delay in investment.  This linkage between higher 
uncertainty and longer inefficient investment delay has particular relevance for 
developing and transition economies where high uncertainty and weak contract 
enforcement is common. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
  Uncertainty and weak contract enforcement are two defining features of many 
developing and transition economies.  It is well understood that these features constrain 
investment and thus economic growth.  There is an extensive literature on the negative 
impact of uncertainty on investment.  Although this discussion goes back a long way, 
most recently the general argument is made in the real option literature (e.g., Dixit and 
Pindyck’s 1994).  Specifically, uncertainty causes a firm facing an irreversible 
investment decision to delay the decision until the net present value of the investment is 
sufficiently positive, and greater uncertainty generally causes a longer delay. 
Applications to developing and transition countries are, for example, Vonnegut (2000), 
Altomonte and Pennings (2004), and Ninh et al. (2004) who suggest that high levels of 
uncertainty cause investment delays in these economies because of real option effects. 
Another strand of the literature focuses on the role of contract enforcement 
problems in causing low investment.   If complete and fully enforceable contracts cannot 
be used to govern bilateral investment and exchange relationships, then investment may 
be inefficiently low due to “hold-ups” (e.g. Klein et al. 1978; Williamson 1983; 
Grossman and Hart 1986; Tirole 1986; Hart and Moore 1988).  A firm engaged in 
bilateral exchange may under-invest in a specific asset if it worries that its partner will 
behave opportunistically after the investment costs are sunk.  The importance of this 
factor in transition countries is emphasized by Blanchard (1997) and Blanchard and 
Kramer (1997) who argue that low investment is due to “disorganization” within supply 
relationships resulting from weak contract enforcement and asset specificity.
1     
                                                 
1  A related argument is made by  Svensson (1998) and Johnson et al. (2002) who blame low investment in 
developing and transition economies on weak property rights.   2
An important part of the literature on hold-ups has focused on how incomplete 
contracts can be written that potentially solve the problem of under-investment by 
allowing ex post exchange to be renegotiated to the efficient outcome (e.g., Aghion and 
Bolton, 1992; Che and Hausch, 1999).  Moreover, in situations where contracts cannot be 
enforced, bilateral agreements between firms can be made self-enforcing (e.g., Grout 
1984; Koss and Eaton 1997 and Schnitzer 1999).  As part of a self-enforcing agreement, 
bilateral firms can use ex ante transfers (sometimes referred to as co-payments) to sustain 
investment and increase collective welfare. With an ex ante transfer, the non-investing 
firm pays for part of the sunk investment costs, which efficiently changes the ex post 
incentives during contract renegotiation (Williamson 1983).  Koss and Eaton (1997) 
explain that an ex ante transfer must be specific to the investment (i.e., Williamson’s 
mutual reliance relationship must be achieved) and thus might be in the form of the non-
investing firm supplying the investing firm with investment components or inputs that 
can be used by the investing firm only if the specific investment take place.  Gow and 
Swinnen (2001) provide empirical evidence of the connection between ex ante transfers 
and specific investments in a transition environment.  
These different strands of literature have made convincing cases for the 
importance of both factors as causes of underinvestment.  However, as pointed out above, 
most developing and transition countries are characterized by the simultaneous existence 
of weak contract enforcement and high uncertainty.  An unanswered question is how both 
effects interact with each other and to what extent the simultaneous occurrence of both 
factors has a mitigating or a reinforcing effect on underinvestment.  The studies on the 
impact of holdups on investment with self-enforcing contracts do not allow for the   3
emergence of real options because the models are static rather than dynamic and/or price 
uncertainty is assumed away.  Similarly, real option models do not allow for investment 
distortions due to asset specificity and imperfect contracting.   
  In this paper, we address this issue by developing a model of the interaction and 
joint effect of uncertainty and weak contract enforcement on investment and then derive 
the implications of this interaction.  In particular, we model this interaction by integrating 
a continuous-time real options model with a two-stage holdup model of specific 
investment, where firms attempt to reduce the investment distortion by negotiating an ex 
ante transfer.   
Our approach goes beyond previous attempts to integrate an incomplete 
contracting model and a real option model.  Sanchez (2003) describes a joint model of 
transaction costs and real options, but it is done in the context of organizational theory, 
and has little relevance for the analysis at hand.  Dynamic theories of bilateral exchange 
with incomplete contracting are now emerging, but real options are typically not 
considered (Che and Sakovics 2004, Smirnov and Wait 2004, Pitchford and Snyder 
2001).
2 Another innovation of our approach compared to Koss and Eaton (1997), which 
provides the starting point for our analysis, is that we allow for non-cooperative 
bargaining rather than cooperative bargaining over the size of the ex ante transfer.  
                                                 
2 Che and Sakovics (2004) use a dynamic model of investment and bargaining where firms are able to 
continue to invest until they agree on the terms of trade.  They find that the standard result of 
underinvestment due to holdup does not emerge if firms are sufficiently patient, and investment distortions 
are due to binding individual rationality constraints rather than the surplus sharing rule.  Smirnov and Wait 
(2004) allow for sequential investment, in which case one firm makes the initial investment and the 
contract is negotiated for the investment by the second firm.  As compared to the standard case of 
simultaneous investment, sequential investment results in an additional source of holdup because it will 
increase the cost of investment delay.  Pitchford and Snyder (2001) examine a non-contractual solution to 
the holdup problem with gradual investment.   4
  The main result of our paper is that, beyond the simple addition of both effects, 
uncertainty reinforces the investment delay caused by the hold-up problem by reducing 
the effectiveness of the negotiated ex ante transfer.  Effectiveness diminishes because 
firms negotiate less efficient ex ante transfers with higher uncertainty, and this 
inefficiency magnifies the distortion in investment incentives.  In general, negotiated 
transfers are not fully effective at eliminating the investment distortion in an uncertain 
environment, and the effectiveness of the transfer declines with higher levels of price 
uncertainty.  Only in the extreme case of no uncertainty does the transfer eliminate the 
investment distortion.   
Our findings have important implications.  First, they may help to explain the 
dramatic investment reductions in transition economies in the early period of reforms, 
when contract enforcement became a major problem and uncertainty increased strongly.  
Vice versa, it may contribute to explain the rapid increases of investment in more recent 
periods when uncertainty has reduced substantially and contract enforcement has 
improved in these countries.  Second, our findings also imply that policy reforms in 
developing and transition economies which increase (reduce) uncertainty may have 
stronger negative effects on investment than previously recognized.  If policy reforms, 
such as trade liberalization, increase (reduce) uncertainty for potential investors in 
countries with weak contract enforcement, the investment response may be larger than 
anticipated. 
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we lay out the basic 
assumptions of the model and solve the ex post bargaining game.  In Section 3 we create 
a benchmark by deriving the relationship between uncertainty and investment in a perfect   5
contracting environment.  The investment problem for the bilateral firms is solved in 
Section 4 first without and then with the inclusion of ex ante transfers.  The main results 
of the analysis, which link inefficient investment to uncertainty via inefficient bargaining 
over the transfer, are also presented in Section 4.  Section 5 contains concluding 
comments. 
 
 2. The Model  
Consider the situation of a firm, P, which is considering making an investment in 
an economy.  Firm P would like to produce and sell into a local market a high-quality 
product which is currently not produced within the local region.  An illustration of such a 
case is investments by global food and retailing companies in emerging, transition, and 
developing economies which have increased strongly in the recent decade (Swinnen, 
2006).   
The local market price for this high quality product is  () pt τ + , where 
() () ,
LH p tp p ∈  is the exogenous stochastic price in a distant market at time t, and τ  is 
the unit transportation/import cost.  We assume that processing capacity is one unit of 
output per unit of time and that for each unit of output, P requires one unit of a high-
quality raw ingredient.  For example, for high quality cheese to be sold by a dairy 
processing company, the company requires a supply of high-quality milk; for high-
quality packaged vegetables to be sold in a modern retail chain, it needs to source high-
quality vegetables.  
A representative local firm, S, is currently producing only low quality raw 
materials (e.g., vegetables and milk for sales in the local village market) and competition 
is such that it currently earns zero profits.  It is possible for S to shift production from low   6
quality products to high quality raw materials for P, but only if S makes a substantive 
investment.  For simplicity, assume that with such an investment, production by S will 
exactly equal the demand requirements of P. 
The high quality version of the raw material sells on the distant market at 
stochastic price () () ,
L H wt w w ∈  at time t.   The unit transportation cost for this 
commodity between the local and distant market is equal to τ , which is the same as the 
unit transport cost for the processed good.  Thus, if P chooses to source the raw material 
from the distant market rather than purchasing it locally, the total price paid is  () wt τ + .  
Moreover, should S make the investment to improve the quality of its output and sell the 
high quality raw material in the distant market rather than locally, then its unit revenue is 
equal to  () wt τ − .  If joint investment takes place, but the intermediate good is not 
exchanged locally, then the margin earned by P at time t is 
() ( ) () () () () ()
n
P tp t w t c p t w t c πτ τ =+ −+ − = − −  and the margin earned by S is 
() ()
n
S tw t m πτ =− − , where c and m are the unit production costs for P and S, 
respectively.
3 Both of these margins are assumed to take on a positive value for all price 
realizations, which implies 
LH p wc −>  and
L wm τ >+ . 
The price series for  () p t  and  () wt  are assumed to be stationary, so as of date v 
the expected value of all future realizations of  () p t  and  () wt  equal  () p v  and  () wv , 
respectively.  Thus, as of date t, the present value of the expected stream of margins 
without local exchange is  ()
n
P t π θ  for P and  ()
n
S t π θ  for S, where θ  is the instantaneous 
                                                 
3 This assumption, which implies that S finds it more profitable to export the high quality raw material 
rather than forfeiting the quality premium by selling it locally, is consistent with the assumption that S 
earns zero profits prior to investment.   7
rate of discount, which is assumed to be the same for both firms.  Let 
0
P I  and 
0
S I  denote 
the respective (fully sunk) investment costs for firms P and S, respectively.  Assume that 
0 ()
n
PP I t π θ >  and 
0 ()
n
SS I t π θ >  for all  ( ) () ,
LH p tp p ∈  and  ( ) () ,
L H wt w w ∈ .  These two 
assumptions imply that unilateral investment by P and S is not expected to be profitable 
at any price realization.  Also assume that  ( )
00 () PS II p t c m τ θ +< + − −  for all 
() () ,
LH p tp p ∈ , which implies that bilateral investment and exchange between the two 
firms is expected to be profitable for all price realizations.  Values for 
0
P I  and 
0
S I  can be 
found to satisfy these various restrictions by assuming  ( ) 2
HL pP τ >− .  This inequality 
makes sense because the value of bilateral investment and exchange is fully attributable 
to transportation cost savings. 
Before examining the bilateral investment and exchange problem, it is useful to 
impose more structure on the relationship between  () p t  and  () wt  within the distant 
market.  Specifically, assume the following linear relationship: 
(1)  () () wt k pt γ =+  
where 01 γ << .
4 To ensure consistency with the previous restrictions, 
LH p wc −>  and 
L wm τ >+ , it is necessary to choose k such that 
LL H mpk p pc τγ γ + −< < −− .  
Parameter combinations can be chosen such that this restriction is satisfied.   
 
                                                 
4 This assumed relationship between  () p t  and  () wt  greatly simplifies the analysis.  It is unlikely that a 
more general specification would reverse any of our main results.  The key assumption is 01 γ <<  
because, as is shown below, γ  and 1 γ −  are the equilibrium bargaining shares for the two firms.  The 
implied assumption of imperfect transmission between the final commodity price and raw ingredient price 
is appropriate for many real-world markets.   8
Ex Post Bargain:  The problem facing the two firms is that they operate in an 
environment where a contract is prohibitively costly to enforce, and thus cannot be used 
to enforce the proposed terms of bilateral investment and exchange.  The firms must 
therefore rely on an implicit self-enforcing contract to govern the exchange relationship.  
Specifically, each firm will anticipate the outcome of the bargaining game that will 
emerge after the investment costs have been sunk, and the investment decisions will 
depend exclusively on this anticipated outcome.  We now analyze the equilibrium 
outcome of the non-cooperative bargaining game that takes place after S and P 
simultaneously sink their respective investment costs.   
In non-cooperative bargaining theory, a firm’s inside option is an important 
determinant of the bargaining outcome (DeMeza and Lockwood, 1998).  The inside 
options for P and S are equal to  ( )
n
P t π  and  ( )
n
S t π , respectively, because these are the unit 
margins that can be earned after the investment costs have been sunk, but prior to the two 
firms reaching an agreement on the ex post transfer price.  In a standard sequential-offer 
non-cooperative bargaining game, with equal and relatively small rates of discount, each 
firm receives approximately the value of its inside option plus one half of the gains from 
trade, and the agreement is reached immediately (Rubinstein 1982, Sutton 1986).  For the 
case at hand, the gains from trade equal2τ , because S and P each save their respective 
transportation costs if they trade with each other rather than utilizing the distant market.
5  
                                                 
5 Schnitzer (1999) uses a trigger strategy formulation to solve an infinitely-repeated bargaining game in her 
model of specific investment with an implicit self-enforcing contract.  Schnitzer’s bargaining outcome is 
equivalent to that which emerges with a conventional (one-shot) non-cooperative bargaining model.  It is 
therefore reasonable to assume that S and P bargain just once immediately after investment.  The 
equilibrium bargaining rule that emerges is then utilized to continually divide up the ex post surplus which 
evolves stochastically over time.  Neither firm has an incentive to initiate a new bargaining session, 
because the bargaining rule that would emerge from the new session would always be the same as the 
original bargaining rule.   9
  Based on this bargaining outcome, after investment occurs and an agreement is 
reached, S will receive at time t profit flow equal to  () ()
y
S tw tm π = − , and P will receive 
at time t profit flow equal to  () () ()
y
P tp tw t c πτ = −+ − .  Substituting in equation (1) 
allows these two equations to be rewritten as 
(2)  () ()
y
S tk mp t πγ =−+  
and 
(3) ( ) (1 ) ( )
y
P tc k p t πτ γ =−−+− . 
These two equations show that the parameter γ  is key to the analysis because its value 
determines the allocation of the stochastic component of ex post surplus across the two 
firms.  
  Now that the ex post bargaining game has been solved, we can move back to the 
point in time when the firms are making their investment decisions.  Specifically, an 
investment rule is derived for P and S at date 0, and these rules are used to calculate the 
expected timing of the investment.  Investment rules take the form of a threshold for p(t): 
invest if p(t) rises above the threshold and do not invest otherwise.  We begin the next 
section by solving for the investment rule and the expected timing of investment when 
firms operate with an enforceable contract.  We later compare this outcome to the case 
where firms operate without an enforceable contract in order to identify inefficient delay 
in investment. 
 
3.  Investment Delay without an Ex Ante Transfer 
 
Investment with an Enforceable Contract:  If an enforceable and complete contract can be 
written to govern the investment and exchange relationship between P and S, then it is   10
well known that the joint investment rule will be efficient and identical to the rule utilized 
by P and S if they were vertically integrated.  The investment problem for the two firms 
with a perfect contract is therefore the same as the generic single-firm investment 
problem, which has been studied extensively in the economics and finance literature (see 
Dixit and Pindyck 1994 for an overview).  In the basic investment model, which was first 
analyzed by MacDonald and Siegel (1986), the firm optimally chooses when to pay a 
sunk cost I in exchange for a project with value V where V follows geometric Brownian 
motion (GBM).  Specifically, 
(4)  () () () d Vt Vtd t Vtd z α σ =+ 
where  t dz dt ε =  is the increment to a Wiener process ( t ε  is a standard normal random 
variable and dt is an infinitesimal small unit of time), α  is the drift parameter and σ  is a 
parameter that governs the variability of V(t).
6  Two important properties of V(t) are: (i) 
() hV t  also evolves according to equation (4) for an arbitrary constant, h; and (ii) the 
expected value of V(t) discounted back to period T is 
() () ()
atT VTe
θ − −− when θ α > . 
  In the current model, assume that p(t) follows GBM with  0 α =  (i.e., zero drift to 
ensure price stationarity), variance parameter σ  and reflecting barriers at  ()
L p tp =  and 
()
H p tp = .
7  Let  () i T Φ  denote the date T expected discounted flow of post-investment 
profits for firm  {,} iS P ∈ , assuming that joint investment takes place at time T.  Using 
equations (2) and (3), it follows that  
                                                 
6 This specification implies that at any given point in time, the change in the logarithm of V(t) is normally 
distributed over the next infinitesimally small increment of time, and the parameters of this normal 
distribution are independent of the current value for V(t). 
7 Because  () p t  is subject to lower and upper reflecting barriers, we should not use the standard real option 
solution techniques, which assume no barriers.  We nevertheless ignore this constraint and apply the 
standard solution techniques in order to obtain an analytical solution.  There is no apparent reason to expect 
that this simplification will reverse the main qualitative results of this paper.   11

















Φ= + . 
 Let  () () () PS TTT Φ= Φ + Φ  denote the combined post-investment profits for the 
pair of firms who jointly choose to invest at time T.  If the two firms with a perfect 
contract had only a now-or-never investment opportunity at date 0, then they would 
choose to invest because, as was assumed earlier, 
00 (0) 0 PS II Φ −−> .  With the option to 
defer the investment decision, real option theory tells us that joint investment will take 
place at time t only if 
00 () PS tII Φ−− takes on a sufficiently large positive value because 
the option to defer the investment decision is valuable for the pair of firms.   
Let  () () p T VT θ =  and  0
(0) (0) P VV θ ≡= .  It follows from equations (5) and (6) 
that  






Φ= + .   
The problem facing the pair of firms with a perfect contract is to determine when it is 
optimal to pay a sunk cost 
000
s p I II ≡+ in exchange for a flow of profits with expected 
value at time t equal to  () t Φ .  Recalling the first property of GBM described above, an 







≡−  in exchange for a cash flow with discounted expected value V(t) given 
that V(t) follows GBM with variance parameter σ .  This problem is identical to the one   12
first examined by McDonald and Siegel (1996), and which is analyzed in detail by Dixit 
and Pindyck (1994, pp. 136-144). 
  Following Dixit and Pindyck’s analysis, beginning with  0 (0) VV =  at date 0, the 
perfect-contract investment rule for P and S is to invest only if 





















⎛⎞ =+ + ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
. 
Equation (9) shows that 1 β >  when  0 σ > , which implies from equation (8) that 
* VI > .  
In other words, P and S should only invest if the expected present value of the investment 
is sufficiently positive.  If this investment rule is followed, the date 0 value of the 












Expected Delay with an Enforceable Contract:  The expected delay in investment due to 
option value can be measured in several ways such as the expected date of investment, 
probability that investment takes place by a pre-specified date and the expected discount 
factor.  For this analysis, we measure investment delay with the expected discount factor 
because of its mathematical convenience.
8 An expression for the expected discount factor 
                                                 
8 The expected time of investment is not defined for this problem because of the  0 α =  assumption.  An 
expression for the expected discount factor is presented below and its imputed time of investment is shown 
to be an increasing function of σ .  The probability that a geometric Brownian motion,  () Vt, starting at 
0 V  and moving with zero drift, hits an optimally-chosen  upper boundary, 
* V , and triggers investment   13
for the firms with a perfect contract and which utilize the optimal investment rule can be 




















θ − ⎛⎞ = ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
.  For the remainder of the analysis 
we shall refer to 
*
C T  as the imputed measure of investment delay when P and S operate 
with a perfect contract, and note that imputed delay is inversely related to the expected 
discount factor.  Because imputed delay is closely related to the standard measures of 
delay discussed above, we shall use it for the remainder of the analysis. Equations (9) and 
(10) can be differentiated to show that a higher level of uncertainty, as measured by σ , 
simultaneously increases 
* V  and decreasesβ , but the net effect of σ  on the expected 
discount factor is positive.  Consequently, higher uncertainty raises imputed delay for the 
pair of firms who operate with a perfect contract.  
 
Investment without an Enforceable Contract:  When S and P operate without a contact, 
then each firm independently calculates and uses its own investment rule.  However, 
because both firms must invest for bilateral exchange to take place, it is the rule of the 
firm with the longest delay that determines the actual timing of the investment.  Let 
                                                                                                                                                 
before time T equals () () () ( )
1
*
0 2l n l n NV V T σ
− ⎛⎞ − ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
 where  ( )
. N  is the cumulative density 
function for a standard normal random variable (see Sarkar 2000 for details).  Simulation results confirm 
that, independent of T, the probability of investment is a decreasing function of σ  for a wide range of 
parameter values (e.g., when  .05 θ ≥  and ( ) ( )
*
0 .1 VI VI − ≥− ).  Because higher uncertainty increases 
the time of investment imputed from the expected discount factor and decreases the probability of 
investment for a wide range of parameter values, it is reasonable to use the expected discount factor as a  
measure of delay in our analysis.    14
() () s Vt p t
γ
θ
=  and 
1



















=− .  
It follows from the analysis of the previous section that the investment problem facing 
firm  {,} iS P ∈  is to determine the point at which it is optimal to pay a sunk cost  i I  in 
exchange for a cash flow with discounted expected value Vi(t) given that Vi(t) follows 








 (the firms share a common solution value for β  because the GBM for Vi(t) 
is the same for both firms). 
 Noting  that  0 (0) s Vp
γ
θ






= , it follows from equation (11) that 
the expected discount factors when S and P respectively determine the time of investment 














































** * max , N SP TT T ∈  where 
*
S T  and 
*
P T  are the respective imputed delays, defined 
analogous to 
*
C T  in the previous section. 
*
N T  is the imputed delay for the pair of firms that 
operate without a contract given the restriction that the firm with the longest delay 
determines the time of joint investment. 
Because a contract cannot be used to allocate ex post surplus to the two firms 
based on shares of total sunk investment expense, a gap will generally exist between the 
preferred timing of investment across the two firms (i.e., one firm will want to invest   15
earlier than the other).  Recalling that γ  is a parameter from the pricing function given by 
equation (1), equation (11) reveals that 
**
SP TT =  only when 




γ = . 
It is easy to show that 
**
SP TT >  when 
* γ γ <  and 
**
SP TT <  when 
* γ γ > .  In the first case, S 
delays investment longer than that preferred by P and in the second case P is the cause of 
the excessive delay.  This result is the dynamic equivalent of the conventional holdup 
problem.   
Here, we focus only on the case where S is the cause of the excessive delay in 
investment -- the results for the opposite case are symmetric.  As well, it is useful to 
focus on the case where the standard holdup result emerges (i.e., no investment takes 
place) in the absence of uncertainty.  Both of these assumptions, together with the 
assumption that the expected net present value of the joint investment is collectively 
positive, can be summarized as follows.  
 
Assumption 1:  








Investment Delay without an Enforceable Contract:   Before completing the model by 
incorporating bargaining over the transfer, it is useful to discuss the relationship between 
price uncertainty and investment delay in the absence of ex ante bargaining.  Assumption 
1 implies that with no price uncertainty and with no ex ante bargaining, firms P and S 
never invest even though joint investment is collectively profitable.  In other words, in 
the absence of uncertainty the standard hold-up result emerges alone and so investment 
does not take place.  As price uncertainty increases, there is some chance that, despite the   16
hold-up constraint, price will rise to a high enough level to trigger joint investment by S 
and P.  In general, higher price uncertainty will further decrease investment delay when 
two firms operate without an enforceable contract and do not negotiate an ex ante 
transfer.  On the other hand, if the two firms did have an enforceable contract, then the 
opposite situation emerges: zero investment delay is optimal in the absence of price 
uncertainty, and investment delay further increases as price uncertainty increases.
9  
 
4. Investment Delay with an Ex Ante Transfer 
In order to increase expected profits, P can induce S to invest earlier by paying for 
a portion of S’s sunk investment cost.
10 The extent that P is individually willing to 
increase the transfer in order to reduce the investment distortion must be determined.  
Moreover, it may be the case that S will successfully negotiate a relatively large transfer, 
in which case its ex ante investment share will fall below its ex post surplus share, and 
then P will be the cause of the excessive delay in investment.  Koss and Eaton (1997) 
derive the optimal transfer in a cooperative bargaining framework, whereas we use a non-
cooperative approach, which fully accounts for individual incentives and the fact that a 
contract cannot be used to link the transfer with post-investment revenue shares. 
 
                                                 
9 These results can be established formally using equation (11) and the first expression in equation (12).  
No uncertainty impliesβ →∞ by equation (9), in which case, given Assumption 1, the expected discount 
factor becomes infinitely large with a contract and converges to zero without a contract (thus 
* 0 C T →  and 
*
N T →∞).  As σ  increases,β  decreases, which reduces the value of equation (11) and increases the 
value of the first expression in equation (12).  These two results imply that 
*
C T  continually increases and 
*
N T  continually decreases as σ  is increased.  However, 
** 0 NC TT − ≥  for all values of σ .   
10 Assume that the specificity restrictions on this transfer, which were discussed in the Introduction, are 
satisfied.   17
Individually-Preferred Transfers:  Before deriving the equilibrium transfer, it is useful to 
derive the transfers that P and S individually prefer, which obviously guide the offers and 
counteroffers of these two firms in the bargaining game.  Let Ω denote the size of the 
transfer that P provides to S.  Notice that if 
** Ω =Ω  where 
**
S I I γ Ω =−, then S’s post-
transfer share of the total investment expense is equal toγ , which implies that the 
investment incentives facing both firms are identical to that with a perfect contract.  If 
both firms find it in their self interest to agree on an ex ante transfer of size 
** Ω=Ω , then 
the distortion will be eliminated and investment timing will be efficient. 
 Suppose 
** Ω≤Ω , in which case S will choose an investment delay that is equal 
to or longer then that preferred by P.  The corresponding expected discount factor for the 























⎜⎟ −Ω ⎜⎟ − ⎝⎠
. 
On the other hand, if 
** Ω≥Ω , then P will choose a delay that is equal to or longer than 

























⎜⎟ +Ω ⎜⎟ − ⎝⎠
. 
 It can easily be shown that the individually-optimal transfer for P involves 
** Ω≤Ω  whereas the opposite is true for S.  Thus, using equations (8), (10) and (14), and   18









 when investment is triggered, the value of the 
investment opportunity for P with a transfer of size 
** Ω ≤Ω  can be expressed as: 













Ω= − Ω − − Ω ⎜⎟ − ⎝⎠
. 
Similarly, the value of the investment opportunity for S with a transfer of size 
** Ω≥Ω  
can be expressed as 















P Ω  and 
*
S Ω  denote the individually optimal transfers from the perspective of 
P and S, respectively.  The expressions for these two variables are obtained by the 
maximizing equations (16) and (17) with respect to Ω: 
(18)  () * 1


















Note that it is possible for 
* 0 P Ω<, which implies that it is optimal for P to receive a 
transfer from S rather than making a transfer to S. 
  Equations (18) and (19) provide us with important insights.  Use 
**
S I I γ Ω= −  


















.  Notice that 
** *
P Ω →Ω  and 
** *
S Ω →Ω  as  0 σ → (recall that   19
β →∞ as  0 σ → ).  As well, 
** *
P Ω− Ω  and 
** *
S Ω −Ω  are both increasing functions of σ . 
In other words, both firms individually prefer the efficient transfer in the absence of 
uncertainty, but as uncertainty increases, the individually optimal transfer falls below the 
efficient transfer for P and rises above the efficient transfer for S.  It is this linkage 
between uncertainty and a divergence in the preferred level of transfer for the two firms 
that gives rise to the main result of our paper.  In effect, uncertainty has created a 
prisoners’ dilemma for the pair of firms in the ex ante bargaining game.   
 
Equilibrium Transfer:  With uncertainty, P prefers a transfer smaller than 
** Ω  and S 
prefers a transfer greater than 
** Ω , so the two firms must bargain over the actual amount 
of the transfer. Let 
* Ω  denote the equilibrium transfer, which is determining in a non-
cooperative bargaining game.  In Rubinstein’s (1982) non-cooperative bargaining 
framework, 
* Ω  is equal to the equilibrium offer of the firm which is allowed to make the 
first offer (i.e., has the first-mover advantage).  It is not important for our analysis to 
specify whether P or S makes the first offer.  It is sufficient to note that 
* (,)
ee
PS Ω∈Ω Ω  
where 
e
P Ω  and 
e
S Ω  denote the equilibrium offers for P and S, respectively. 
  Rubinstein’s (1982) procedure for calculating the equilibrium of a non-
cooperative bargaining game is to make player A indifferent between accepting the 
equilibrium offer of player B and waiting one period, in which case the equilibrium offer 
of player A will be accepted by player B.
11  An analogous restriction is imposed on 
player B.  Let  e
θλ δ
− =  be the time cost of delay, which is assumed to be the same for the 
two firms (λ  is the length of time between bargaining rounds).  Recall that S determines 
                                                 
11 It is possible to use this procedure for our analysis because both the inside and outside options for the two 
firms equal zero during the bargaining game.   20
the timing of investment when 
e
P Ω=Ω  because 
** e
P Ω <Ω  and P determines the timing of 
investment when 
e
S Ω=Ω  because 
** e
S Ω >Ω .  The equation which implies that P is 
indifferent between accepting an offer of 
e
S Ω =Ω  and waiting one period to have its offer 
of 
e
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The joint solution to equations (21) and (22) provide us with the desired solution values 
for 
e
P Ω  and 
e
S Ω . 
Result 1:  
** * Ω→ Ω as  0 σ →  and 
** * Ω −Ω  increases as σ  increases.  In words, the 
equilibrium transfer converges to the efficient transfer as uncertainty tends to zero, and 
the absolute gap between the equilibrium transfer and the efficient transfer increases as 
uncertainty increases.   21
 
Proof:  We present the proof only for the special case where  1
2 γ = .
12  Let 
** e
PP ∆= Ω− Ω and 
** e
SS ∆ =Ω −Ω .  With  1









Ω− Ω = ∆ = ∆ =
−−
.  It follows immediately from this equation that 
** *0 Ω− Ω → as 0 σ →  andβ →∞.  Moreover, 
** * Ω −Ω  increases as σ  increases 
becauseβ  is a decreasing function of σ .  Q.E.D.   
 
Inefficient Investment Delay:  Result 1 is expected given our previous finding that P and 
S individually prefer the efficient transfer without uncertainty, and respectively prefer a 
lower and higher transfer with uncertainty.  We will explain the intuition for both of these 
results below.  But first, the main result of our analysis is presented.  
 
Result 2:  Given Assumption 1, and assuming that P and S negotiate a transfer in an ex 
ante non-cooperative bargaining game, inefficient investment delay, as measured by 
**
N C TT − , increases as  uncertainty increases. 
 
Proof:  Result 1 shows that 
** *
S I I γ Ω→ Ω = −  as  0 σ → .  If this expression is 
substituted into equation (12), the resulting expression is identical to equation (11).  
Consequently, there is no inefficient delay in investment as  0 σ → .  With  0 σ > , then 
the first expression in equation (12) is relevant if 
* e
P Ω =Ω  and the second expression is 
relevant if 
* e
S Ω= Ω.  In both cases, equation (11) takes on a larger value than equation 
                                                 
12 It is straight-forward to analytically establish the result that  
** * Ω →Ω  as  0 σ →  for the general case 
where  1
2 γ ≠ .  Numerical simulations confirm that the second part of Result 2 also holds for values forγ  
other than  1
2 .   22
(12) given that 
** * 0 Ω− Ω >  with  0 σ >  from Result 1.  Moreover, this difference in 
values is an increasing function of σ  given that 
** * Ω −Ω  is an increasing function of σ  
from Result 1.  The difference in the values of equations (11) and (12) is positively 
related to 
**
N C TT − .  Q.E.D. 
 
  Result 2 emerges because uncertainty creates a prisoners’ dilemma situation in the 
ex ante bargaining game between P and S, which in turn causes an inefficient bargaining 
outcome.  Specifically, P and S choose a suboptimal transfer, and regardless of whether 
this transfer is inefficiently low (if P has the first-mover advantage in the bargaining 
game) or inefficiently high (if S has the first-mover advantage in the bargaining game), 
the result is the same:  the delay in investment is inefficiently long.  Greater price 
uncertainty results in a less efficient equilibrium transfer and consequently more 
inefficient delay in investment. 
  What remains to be explained is why greater price uncertainty causes P to lower 
its equilibrium transfer offer and S to increase its equilibrium transfer offer.  We will 
explain the first outcome only because the argument for the second outcome is 
symmetric. The marginal benefit for S from receiving a marginally higher transfer from P 
is lower with higher uncertainty.  Because of this lower marginal benefit, the extent that S 
reduces investment delay given a marginally higher transfer from P is less at higher levels 
of uncertainty.  A smaller reduction in investment delay for a marginally higher transfer 
implies that P’s marginal value of the transfer is lower with higher uncertainty.  This 
lower marginal value reduces the value of P’s optimal transfer and equilibrium-offer 
transfer.     23
Why is a marginally higher transfer less valuable for S with greater uncertainty?  
The reason is the same as why a marginally lower investment expense is less valuable for 
an integrated firm at higher levels of uncertainty.  If equation (8) is substituted into 
equation (10) and the resulting expression differentiated with respect to I, then it can be 




θ − =− .  In other words, the marginal value of lower investment 
expense for an integrated firm is equal to the expected discount factor.  It was previously 
established that the expected discount factor is smaller with higher uncertainty, so the 
marginal value of lower investment expense must also be lower with higher uncertainty.   
Uncertainty increases the option value, and the higher option value increasingly 
diminishes the benefit of an immediate reduction in investment expense. 
 
5. Conclusions   
 
In this paper we focus on a specific bilateral exchange situation where an 
downstream processor and an upstream supplier engage in bilateral investment and 
exchange to capture rents, which are generated by spatial separation of two markets and 
costly transportation.  The two firms operate in a weak contracting environment, which 
implies that all agreements must be implicit and self-enforcing.  Relative to a perfect 
contracting environment, the value of the supplier’s option to delay the investment 
decision is inefficiently high because the share of the ex post surplus that accrues to the 
supplier is low relative to the supplier’s ex ante share of total investment expense.  
Conversely, the value of the processor’s option to delay the investment decision is 
inefficiently low.  To address this imbalance, the processor pays for a portion of the   24
supplier’s investment expense (i.e., an ex ante transfer).  The equilibrium level of this 
transfer is determined as the outcome of a non-cooperative bargaining game. 
The main result of this analysis is that outcome of the ex ante transfer bargaining 
game is efficient, and thus investment is efficient, in the absence of uncertainty.  Ex ante 
bargaining is inefficient in the presence of uncertainty, which in turn implies that the 
delay in investment is inefficiently long in the presence of uncertainty.  Moreover, the 
delay increases continually as uncertainty increases.  Uncertainty creates a prisoners’ 
dilemma situation for the bargaining firms, and without the ability to contract, the 
inefficiency associated with the prisoners’ dilemma cannot be avoided.  The reason why 
the difference between the equilibrium transfer and the efficient transfer increases with 
added uncertainty is because the real option reduces the marginal value of the transfer for 
the recipient firm.  Higher uncertainty implies a higher value for the real option and thus 
a lower marginal value of the transfer. 
  The model used in this paper is admittedly stylized and constructed for a specific 
situation where the gains from investment are exclusively due to savings in transportation 
costs.  Nevertheless, similar results would likely emerge in a more general model that 
integrates real options and bilateral exchange with weak contract enforcement.  It has 
previously been recognized that real option effects help to explain the negative 
relationship between uncertainty and investment in transition and developing economies.  
Our finding strengthens this negative relationship by accounting for the interactive effects 
of weak contract enforcement and uncertainty.  Our main message for policy makers is 
that uncertainty and weak contract enforcement are complementary constraints, and so 
policy reforms designed to increase investment should account for this connection.   25
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